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Proposed Legislation Concerning a
Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality
Roger C. Cramton*
I. BACKGROUND OF AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
A. California's Professional Duty of Confidentiality
The law governing lawyering in California contains no provision deal-
ing with an attorney's professional duty of confidentiality, other than
one sentence of the Lawyer's Oath. Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e) states: "It is the duty of an attorney... [t]o maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to pre-
serve the secrets, of his or her client."' California is the only state with-
out a professional rule governing lawyers' professional duties of confi-
dentiality.2 California law relating to lawyer confidentiality is sparse
and confusing. Current law also appears to maintain the irresponsible
position that no situations arise in which some other interest outweighs
the important public interest in assuring that clients have a high degree
of confidentiality in information relating to the lawyer-client representa-
tion.' This Article proposes legislation to remedy this void. Confidenti-
* Roger C. Cramton is the Robert S. Stevans Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School. He served as a visiting professor at Pepperdine University School of Law
during spring 1995 term.
1. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1995).
2. See ATrORNEYS' LIABITY ASSURANCE SOCIETY, STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF ETHICS
RULES ON CLIENT CONFIDENCES (Feb. 1994), reprinted in THoMAS D. MORGAN & RON-
ALD D. ROTUNDA, 1995 SELECTED STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBIITY 132-40
app. A [hereinafter ALAS] (citing a professional rule governing the duty of confidenti-
ality for every state except California).
3. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Cotifidentiality in California,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367 (1995). The article states, among other things: "California's
approach to confidentiality ostensibly is the strictest in the United States." Id, at 372.
"[California's] bar organizations have been more interested in preserving attorney-cll-
ent relationships [than in recognizing exceptions to confidentiality that would further
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ality in the lawyer-client relationship is of vital importance, but must
have limits and exceptions. California's statutory attorney-client privi-
lege recognizes sound exceptions applicable to communications made
by a client to a lawyer for purposes of legal advice." The California
Legislature should also state exceptions to the confidentiality rule con-
cerning even less confidential information, often not even from the cli-
ent, that a lawyer acquires in the course of representation.
Because section 6068(e) has no stated exceptions, it has given rise to
an attitude within the legal profession that confidentiality of client in-
formation is an absolute requirement, totally lacking in any exceptions.6
A few California decisions recognize implied exceptions,' but the gener-
al posture of California law provides no explicit permission or obliga-
tion for a lawyer to disclose confidential client information in the fol-
lowing situations, not to mention others:
1. Threatened Death or Substantial Bodily Irury
A lawyer learns from a client that the client is holding a
young woman in a confined space with food and water suf-
ficient to last only a few weeks. Or, an angry and violent
client storms out of his lawyer's office, armed with a weap-
on, after making convincing statements that he is going to
kill his spouse.
Eleven states require a lawyer, when the lawyer reasonably believes
that a threat is, or is likely to become, a reality, to disclose the client's
intention to commit a crime likely to result in death or bodily irjury;
thirty-nine other jurisdictions permit the lawyer to disclose.! Only Cali-
truthful outcomes in judicial proceedings and protect the interests of third persons].
They have taken a broad and rigid view of confidentiality's scope." Id, at 370. Fur-
ther, legislative amendment of § 6068(e) is desirable because "[tihe status quo inevita-
bly puts predictable and meaningful lawyer-client relationships at risk." Id at 405.
4. CAL EViD. CODE §§ 956-962 (West Supp. 1995).
5. See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 370 (noting the "broad and rigid view of
confidentiality's scope" lawyers have taken).
6. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 1188-89,
876 P.2d 487, 502-04, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 16-17 (1994) (suggesting that exceptions to
California Evidence Code §§ 956-958 are implied exceptions to the lawyer's profes-
sional duty of confidentiality in California Business and Professions Code § 6068(e));
People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 694-95, 631 P.2d 46, 53-54, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612,
619-20 (1981) (holding that a lawyer must turn over physical evidence of crime to a
prosecutor when the lawyer has removed or altered evidence even though doing so
may disclose confidential client information).
7. See generaUy ALAS, supra note 2. These figures are compiled from the ALAS
memorandun. Id. The District of Columbia is included in the ALAS memorandum
data. I&
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fornia appears to require that the lawyer remain silent' This proposed
bill would permit a lawyer to disclose confidential information to pre-
vent death or substantial bodily harm.'
2. Prospective or Ongoing Client Fraud
A lawyer, retained by a client to assist in arranging and
documenting a transaction with a third person, learns that
the client has used or is using the lawyer's service to perpe-
trate a fraud on the third person.
All states except California have professional rules dealing with client
fraud: (a) Prevention of criminal fraud by a client: forty-one states
require or permit the lawyer to disclose; nine jurisdictions do not.' (b)
Rectification of client fraud in which the lawyer's services have been
used: seventeen states require or permit the lawyer to disclose." Yet,
the California State Bar has opposed any professional rule that would
permit or require disclosure or rectification of prospective or ongoing
client fraud.' There is currently no such rule, and reliable authorities
8. Id. at 140 n.6 (citing San Diego County Bar Assn. Op. 1990-1 (which states
that a lawyer may not even disclose client confidential information when the client
has "expressed an intention to kill or injure someone else"); see also Cal. State Bar
Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1981-58, at
62 (holding that § 6068(e) forbids a lawyer to disclose an expert engineer's conclu-
sion that a structure occupied by third parties may be unstable in an earthquake).
9. It can be argued that the 1993 legislative amendment to the lawyer-client privi-
lege, contained in Evidence Code § 956.5, also modified the professional duty of con-
fidentiality. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
10. See ALAS, supra note 2, at 132-40.
11. See id,
12. Id, at 140 n.6. On two occasions the State Bar has proposed rules addressing
confidentiality, first in 1987 and then again in 1992. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 372-
73 & n.18. The 1992 proposal, Proposed Rule 3-100, Duty to Maintain Confidence
and Secrets Inviolate, permitted disclosure of a confidence or secret on only two
grounds: (1) consent of the client, or (2) "to prevent the commission of a criminal
act that the member believes is imminently likely to result in death or substantial
bodily injury." Proposed Rule 3-100 to Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct (1992),
reprinted in Zacharas, supra note 3, at 372-73 & n.18. The 1987 proposal was identi-
cal, except that it also included a self-defense exception and permitted disclosure
when ordered by a court. Id. at 373 & n.18. Neither proposed rule, if adopted, would
have permitted or required disclosure to prevent or rectify a criminal fraud by the
client which involved the use of the lawyer's services. Id,; see also Cal. State Bar
Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1993-133, at
3-4 ("[The] attorney's duty to maintain client confidences and secrets inviolate is
broader in scope than the [lawyer-client] privilege.").
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state that California law does not permit any disclosure.' This bill per-
mits a lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent the client
from committing a fraud, or to rectify the consequences of a client's
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the client used
the lawyer's services. This proposed bill will discourage clients from
using lawyers to commit fraud.
3. Criminal Fraud on a Tribunal
A lawyer learns that a client intends to offer false evidence
either personally or through an alibi witness.
Current law everywhere requires the lawyer to remonstrate with the
client and to refuse to offer the perjured testimony of a witness." The
professional rules of the vast majority of states require the lawyer to go
further: The lawyer must counsel the client that if the client insists on
testifying falsely, the lawyer must seek to withdraw and, if necessary,
reveal the client's intended or past perjury to the tribunal. Usually
this advice results in the client either not taking the stand or testifying
truthfully." In California, a lawyer may not use a threat of disclosure
to persuade a client not to testify falsely, because California law appar-
ently does not permit the lawyer to disclose perjured testimony." The
13. See ALAS, supra note 2.
14. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., gr AL, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF AWYERING 373 (2d
ed. 1994).
15. A California lawyer may not knowingly offer false evidence or suborn perjury,
but no California rule or statute parallels the professional rules of 38 states, which
require a lawyer to reveal client confidential information to rectify a prior or contem-
poraneous commission of perjury or other fraud on a tribunal. See ALAS, supra note
2. The professional rules of three states clearly prohibit such disclosure. Id. at 139
n.4. Nine others retain versions of ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR
7-102(B)(1), which may be interpreted either to require or prohibit disclosure, depend-
ing upon whether the jurisdiction adopted a 1974 ABA amendment and follows the
interpretation of the 1974 amendment stated in ABA Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 341. Id
16. See HAZARD, supra note 14, at 374-75 (citing ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics Formal Opinion 353 (1987)).
17. See People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 942-46, 755 P.2d 917, 932-35, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 467, 482-85 (1988) (holding that use of the "narrative approach" by a criminal
defense lawyer does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); People v.
Brown, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1335, 1338-40, 250 Cal. Rptr. 762, 763-65 (1988) (holding that
a California lawyer, knowing that a client plans to give false testimony, must seek to
withdraw if efforts to persuade the client to testify truthfully are unsuccessful, and
holding that the trial judge has broad discretion to deny the withdrawal request, as
happened in this case). Qr Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986) (finding that a
criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is not violated when the
defense lawyer persuades the client to testify truthfully by threatening disclosure if
the client testifies falsely).
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threat would be a false one that the lawyer cannot make. This proposed
bill requires a lawyer to disclose confidential information to rectify
prior false testimony or evidence offered by a lawyer in an adjudicatory
proceeding (fraud on the tribunal). The proposed legislation, by dis-
couraging the use of false evidence, protects the integrity of judicial
proceedings and furthers public acceptance of their judgments.
4. Lawyer Self-Defense
A client sues a lawyer for malpractice, the state's disciplin-
ary body charges the lawyer with a grievance for conduct in
representing a client, or the lawyer seeks to collect a reason-
able fee from a client who has unjustifiably refused to pay.
Every state except California has a confidentiality rule that permits
the lawyer to disclose client information to the extent necessary to
protect the lawyer's reputational, professional, and economic inter-
ests." Due process clearly requires that the lawyer be able to disclose
client confidences as a defense to legal liability or professional disci-
18. If there were no implied exceptions to California's Business and Professions
Code § 6068(e), a lawyer could not plead and prove a claim that a client failed to
pay for services rendered. Without the client's consent, the lawyer's duty of confiden-
tiality prohibits proof of facts concerning the services rendered. The same is true of
an action in which a third person sues the lawyer for actions growing out of the
lawyer's representation of a client Without the client's consent, the lawyer could not
volunteer testimony or documents that would provide the lawyer a defense. When the
client files a malpractice action against a lawyer, however, the forensic doctrine of
fairness would permit the lawyer to establish a defense: The client waives the attor-
ney-client privilege by putting it in issue. See HAZARD, supra note 14, at 285. But
exceptions to the testimonial privilege are not be invoked when the lawyer is the
claimant, or the client is not a party. In those situations, it is the lawyer who takes
the initiative to disclose client confidential information to protect the lawyer's own
interests. In passing on claims by and against lawyers, courts in California tacitly
recognize an implied exception to the professional duty of confidentiality. See
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir. 1979) (find-
ing that a law firm was entitled to recover a one million dollar contingent fee from
a corporate client for filing a certiorari petition because the fee was not "unconscio-
nable" under applicable California law); see also LA. County Bar Ass'n, Formal Op.
396 (1982) (recognizing an implied exception to confidentiality for lawyer self-de-
fense). The legislature should specifically recognize the lawyer self-defense exception.
by statute. It is wrong and anomalous, however, to sacrifice client confidentiality
when a lawyer's economic interests are at stake, but not when the economic inter-
ests of third persons are involved, as in client fraud situations.
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pline.9 This bill permits a lawyer to disclose confidential information
when reasonably necessary in self-defense or to collect a just fee.
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The professional duty of confidentiality must be contrasted with the
attorney-client privilege, which comes into play only when a tribunal
with powers of compulsory process seeks to compel a lawyer or a cli-
ent to testify or provide documents disclosing client communications
made to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.20 Evidence
Code sections, beginning with section 952, deal in detail with the law-
yer-client privilege in California.2' These sections give large. protection
to the personal and social interests that support confidentiality in the
lawyer-client relationship, but contain a number of sound exceptions
for situations in which other interests outweigh those of client confi-
dentiality.2' These important departures from confidentiality include:
(a) the crime-fraud exception, ' (b) the death or bodily injury excep-
tion,' (c) the deceased client exception,2' (d) the exception when a
19. See HAZARD, supra note 14, at 285.
20. CAL. EVID. CODE § 955 (West Supp. 1995); HAzARD, supra note 14, at 220. For
a discussion of the attorney-client privilege and the separate professional duty of
confidentiality, see id. at 220-349 (discussing and contrasting both doctrines); CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 242-311 (1986) (same).
21. CAL Evi). CODE §§ 952-962 (West Supp. 1995).
22. See id.
23. CAL. EviD. CODE § 956 (West Supp. 1995) ("There is no privilege under this
article if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone
to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud.").
24. CAL. EvID. CODE § 956.5 (West Supp. 1995) ("There is no privilege under this
article if the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communi-
cation relating to representation of a client is necessary to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm.").
Evidence Code § 956.5 was adopted in 1993 after the Supreme Court declined to
adopt proposed Rule 3-200. See Zacharas, supra note 3, at 372-73 & n.18. Section
956.5 amends the statutory lawyer-client privilege to deny the privilege in the same
situations that the State Bar's proposed confidential rule would have permitted volun-
tary disclosure by a lawyer. See id. The problem is that the statutory lawyer-client
privilege only protects client confidential communications when a tribunal with com-
pulsory process seeks to force a lawyer or client to disclose privileged information.
An exception to the privilege merely means that a court may compel testimony over
an objection based on the privilege. The testimonial privilege also covers a narrower
category of Information: The privilege covers only communications between a lawyer
and a client for purposes of legal advice. The professional duty of confidentiality, on
the other hand, covers all information acquired by a lawyer during the course of or
relating to the representation. Since the longstanding crime-fraud exception of § 956
denied the privilege to client communications made for the purposes of any crime or
fraud, communications involving the criminal acts dealt with in the 1993 amendment
1472
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client breaches a duty to a lawyer,' and (e) the joint client excep-
tion.'
C. Purposes of the Proposed Bill
The purpose of the following bill is to clarify the confidentiality du-
ties of lawyers in situations not governed by the attorney-client privi-
lege, that is, situations other than when a tribunal with compulsory pro-
cess seeks to compel a lawyer's testimony. The California Evidence
Code provides ample and satisfactory scope for confidentiality of client
communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. In
doing so, California accords with evidence law generally, in recognizing
a number of limited exceptions for confidentiality: to prevent the death
or substantial bodily injury of a person; to prevent client crime or
fraud; to prevent the crime of client or witness perjury; to permit the
lawyer to defend himself or herself when charged with wrongdoing by
the client or a third person; and to protect the lawyer's economic inter-
est in collecting a just fee from a client. Similar exceptions are needed
for the broader category of information protected by the professional
duty of confidentiality.
In other states, as previously mentioned, the lawyer's professional
duty of confidentiality is dealt with in a professional rule adopted by
were already denied protection of the privilege. Thus, the amendment accomplished
nothing in terms of the lawyer-client privilege. Was the amendment, which used lan-
guage drawn from the State Bar's rejected proposal on the duty of confidentiality,
intended as an exception to California's Business and Professions Code § 6068(e)? Or
did it have other purposes? Professor Zacharias struggles with these difficult ques-
tions in a recent article. See Zacharias, supra note 3, at 374-78 (arguing that the
meaning of the amendment is unclear and that California law of confidentiality is
confused, chaotic, and in need of clarification).
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 957 (West Supp. 1995) ("There Is no privilege under this
article as to a communication relevant to an issue between parties all of whom claim
through a deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intes-
tate succession or by inter vivos transaction.").
26. CAL EviD. CODE § 958 (West Supp. 1995) ("There is no privilege under this
article as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by
the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship.").
27. CAL EviD. CODE § 962 (West Supp. 1995) ("Where two or more clients have
retained or consulted a lawyer upon a matter of common interest, none of them, nor
the successor in interest of any of them, may claim a privilege under this article as
to a communication made in the course of that relationship when such communica-
tion is offered in a civil proceeding between one of such clients (or his successor in
interest) and another of such clients (or his successor in interest).").
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the highest court of the jurisdiction. This subject is sometimes thought
to be within the exclusive province of the judiciary, which has broad
rulemaling and decisional authority with respect to the conduct of
lawyers in judicial proceedings. In California, however, the source of
both the lawyer-client privilege and the professional duty of confidenti-
ality has been legislative enactment. In 1988, when the supreme court
returned the State Bar's first proposed confidentiality rule for further
consideration by the Bar, the court inquired about the relationship of
the rule to the statutory lawyer-client privilege.' More recently, the
court's opinion in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court' states
that the permissive disclosure provisions of either a statute or ethical
rule, "such as the statutory exceptions to the attorney-client privilege
codified in the Evidence Code," 3 may permit a discharged lawyer em-
ployed by a corporation "to depart from the usual requirement of confi-
dentiality with respect to the client-employer" and establish a claim for
wrongful discharge violative of public policy."' The General Dynamics
opinion suggests that the exceptions to the statutory lawyer-client privi-
28. In June 1988 the Court returned the proposal to the Bar and questioned its
relationship to the statutory lawyer-client privilege:
[11n what context does [the proposed rulel allow for disclosure of otherwise
privileged information? To the extent it permits disclosure in a judicial pro-
ceeding where no statutory exception to the privilege exists, it may be incon-
sistent with, or contravene the legislature's intent underlying Evidence Code
section 950 et seq .... Where the legislature has codified, and revised, or
supplanted privileges previously available at common law, does the court
have inherent authority to modify this statutory privilege?
Letter from the supreme court to President of State Bar (June 23, 1992) (quoted in
Request that the Supreme Court of California Approve Proposed Rule 3-100 of the
Rules of the Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California and Memorandum
and Supporting Documents in Explanation, Recommendation, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1992, at
3).
29. 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 876 P.2d 487, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1994). In General Dynamics,
the court held that a lawyer employed as corporate house counsel had a tort remedy
for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy if two conditions were satisfied:
(1) the circumstances would support such a claim by a discharged non-awyer em-
ployee; and (2) the claim could be established without violating the lawyer's confi-
dentiality obligations. Id. at 1189, 876 P.2d at 503, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. The latter
requirement could be met by showing that "some statute or ethical rule, such as the
statutory exceptions to the attorney-client privilege codified in the Evidence Code,
specifically permits the attorney to depart from the usual requirement of confidentiali-
ty with respect to the client-employer and engage in the 'nonfiduciary conduct for
which he was terminated." Id. (citation omitted); see CAL EVID. CODE §§ 956-958
(West Supp. 1995).
30. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1189, 876 P.2d at 503, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17
(citation omitted); see also CAL EVID. CODE §§ 956-958 (West Supp. 1995).
31. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1189, 876 P.2d at 503, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
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lege now operate as implied exceptions to the confidentiality statute.2
If so, a California lawyer can now disclose client confidences without
client consent, even when no testimonial compulsion is involved, in all
the situations in which Evidence Code sections 956 - 962 deny the privi-
lege.
In any event, Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) should
be amended, whether to conform to the reality suggested by the Gener-
al Dynamics case or to remedy the current state of uncertainty con-
cerning a lawyer's confidentiality obligations. Otherwise, lawyers and
the public will be misled by the text of section 6068(e), which states no
exceptions to the lawyer's duty of confidentiality.' The history of the
treatment of lawyer confidentiality in California by both the Legislature
and the California Supreme Court provides strong support for legisla-
tive correction of the current morass. The legislation proposed here
does not contravene the rulemaking authority of the California Supreme
Court concerning regulation of the legal profession, but has been invit-
ed by prior legislative involvement and the Court's own posture.
The proposed bill remedies the paucity of California law concerning a
lawyer's professional duty of confidentiality, creates exceptions to the
confidentiality rule when more important interests are at stake, brings
the law of California into accord with that of other states, and elimi-
nates the current tension between the California law of privilege and
the professional duty of confidentiality.' The proposed legislation is in
the public interest and should be promptly adopted.
32. See id
33. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1995).
34. Under the Evidence Code, a California lawyer must disclose privileged informa-
tion when called before a tribunal in circumstances in which the public interest in
disclosure outweighs interests in lawyer-client secrecy. See supra notes 20-26 and
accompanying text. The current law, however, prevents the lawyer from making a
disclosure in order to prevent the same harms protected by the universally recog-
nized exceptions to the statutory lawyer-client privilege. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6068(e) (West Supp. 1995). This is so even though much of the information pro-
tected by the duty of confidentiality does not involve communications made between
lawyer and client for purposes of obtaining legal advice. Thus, this information, not
protected by the attorney-client privilege in a court proceeding, receives greater pro-
tection under the duty of confidentiality, a paradoxical result
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II. PROPOSED STATUTE AMENDING CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL DUTY
OF CONFIDENTIALITY
California Business and Professions Code, chapter 4, article 4, section 6068(e) is
hereby amended to read as follows:
[It is the duty of an attomery-.]
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself
to preserve the secrets, of his or her client in accordance with the professional
duty of confidentiality.
(1) DefInitionm. As used in this section, "confidential information" includes
both a "confidence" and "secrets." "Confidence" means information as defined in
Evidence Code section 952 and "secrets" means all information relating to a client
acquired by the lawyer during the course of or by reason of the representation,
other than information protected by section 952.
(2) Duty. Except as permitted by paragraph (3) or as required by paragraph
(4), a lawyer shall not-
(A) Reveal confidential information of a client or a former client.
(B) Use confidential information of a client to the disadvantage of a client
or former client unless the client consents after consultation or the information
has become generally known.
(3) Permissive disclosure. A lawyer may reveal confidential information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary-
(A) When the client consents after consultation;
(B) When the law expressly or impliedly authorizes the lawyer to do so in
order to carry out the representation.
(C) To comply with a court order, a California Rule of Professional Con-
duct, or other law.
(D) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that
the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm, in wrongful detention or incarceration of a person, or in substantial injury
to the financial interests or property of another.
(E) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in
the furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used.
(F) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
(4) False evidence. When a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall make a good faith effort to persuade the client
to authorize the lawyer to correct or withdraw the false evidence. If such efforts
are unsuccessful, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including
disclosure of the true facts. This duty continues until remedial legal measures are
no longer reasonably possible.
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M. EXPLANATORY COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CONFIDENTIALITY BL
A. Confidentiality Generally
1. The general principle that a lawyer should keep client information in
confidence is stated in California Business and Professions Code section
6068(e). Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and
client and proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation
by the lawyer of confidential information of one who has employed or
sought to employ the lawyer. Free discussion should prevail between
lawyer and client in order for the lawyer to be fully informed and for the
client to obtain the full benefit of the legal system. The ethical obligation
of the lawyer to protect the confidential information of the client not
only facilitates the proper representation of the client but also en-
courages potential clients to seek legal assistance.
2. Subject to the permissive disclosure provisions of paragraph (3) and
the mandatory disclosure requirement of paragraph (4), the lawyer gener-
ally should be required to maintain confidentiality of information ac-
quired by the lawyer during the course of or by reason of the represen-
tation of the client. This principle involves a fiduciary obligation, originat-
ing in the law of agency, not to use the information to the detriment of
the client.
3. This principle of confidentiality is given effect not only in this stat-
ute, but also in the law of evidence regarding the lawyer-client privilege,
and in the law of agency. The lawyer-client privilege, developed over
many decades, provides the client a right to prevent certain confidential
communications from being revealed by compulsion of law. The profes-
sional duty of confidentiality, as stated in this section, reinforces the
principles of evidence law relating to the lawyer-client privilege. Com-
munications protected by the lawyer-client privilege are defined in sec-
tion 952 of the California Evidence Code (subject to the exceptions con-
tained in sections 956 - 962).
4. Paragraph (1) of this section defines the information protected by
the lawyer's professional duty of confidentiality. Paragraph (2) states the
lawyer's duty not to reveal confidential information. Privileged communi-
cations are referred to as "confidences" in former Business & Professions
Code section 6068(e) and in this revised section. Unprivileged items of
information not protected by the lawyer-client privilege are referred to as
"secrets." The section defines "confidential information" as including
both privileged information (the "confidences" protected by the lawyer-
client privilege) and "secrets" (other information the lawyer acquires in
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the course of representation). In giving protection to both categories of
information, paragraphs (1) and (2) are in accord with general fiduciary
principles of agency law and with the law of other states. Because the
lawyer's professional duty of confidentiality extends to both categories of
information, for most purposes nothing should turn on whether one cate-
gory of information or the other is involved. Unprivileged information
(client "secrets"), however, is generally entitled to less protection against
disclosure than that given by the Evidence Code to privileged informa-
tion (client "confidences"). Communications made by a client to a lawyer
for purposes of obtaining legal advice serve public as well as private
purposes: The client's candor in seeking legal advice leads to sound ad-
vice and sound advocacy, which in turn furthers law observance and
good judicial administration. If the Evidence Code withdraws protection
from compelled disclosure of information that otherwise would be a
client "confidence," there is even less reason to protect unprivileged
information a lawyer acquires during the course of the representation.
5. The requirement of confidentiality applies to government lawyers
who may disagree with the policy goals that their representation is de-
signed to advance.
B. Disclosure for Benefit of Client
6. The law may impliedly authorize a lawyer to make disclosures to
carry out the representation, and the lawyer is generally recognized as
having implied-in-fact authority to make disclosures about a client when
appropriate in carrying out the representation to the extent that the
client's instructions do not limit that authority. Subparagraphs (3)(A) and
(B) codify these principles. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may dis-
close information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed,
or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory
conclusion. Unless the client has instructed that particular information
be confined to specified lawyers, the lawyer's implied authority also
includes sharing client information with other lawyers in the same firm
and with firm employees and agents whose assistance is necessary to
carry out the representation. Subparagraph (3)(B) continues these long-
standing practices concerning disclosure of confidential information
within a firm.
7. The effect of the duty stated by paragraph (2) is to require the law-
yer to invoke, for the client, the lawyer-client privilege when the lawyer
believes it is applicable; but if the court denies the privilege, under sub-
paragraph (3)(C), the lawyer may testify as ordered by the court or may
test the ruling by seeking reconsideration or appellate review.
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C. Use of Iqformnation
8. Following sound principles of agency law, subparagraph (2)(B) sub-
jects a lawyer to discipline for using information relating to the represen-
tation in a manner disadvantageous to the client, absent the informed
consent of the client. Because a conflict with the lawyer's own interests
may be involved, the lawyer should consult California Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (CRPC) 3-310, which requires that notice of the conflict-
ing interest to the client and the client's informed consent be in writing.
This duty not to misuse client information continues after termination of
the client-lawyer relationship. Therefore, a lawyer is forbidden by sub-
paragraph (2)(B) to use, in absence of the client's informed consent,
confidential information of the former client to the client's disadvantage,
unless the information is generally known.
D. Discretionary Disclosure Adverse to Client
9. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may fore-
see that the client intends to cause serious and perhaps irreparable harm
to another. To the extent a lawyer is prohibited from making disclosure,
the interests of the potential victim are sacrificed in favor of preserving
the client's information-usually unprivileged information-even though
the client's purpose is wrongful. On the other hand, a client who knows
or believes that a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's
wrongful purposes may be inhibited from revealing facts that would
enable the lawyer to counsel effectively against wrongful action. The law
must balance the adverse effects on legal representation against the harm
that will be suffered by victims of the client's actions, the adverse effects
on the integrity of proceedings, and the danger that the public will lose
confidence in legal institutions that prefer secrecy to truthful outcomes.
Subparagraphs (3)(D) and (E) follow the policies embodied in California
Evidence Code sections 956 and 956.5, and therefore permit disclosure in
these relatively rare situations.
10. Evidence Code section 956 follows the underlying public policy of
furnishing no protection to client information where the client seeks or
uses the services of the lawyer to aid in the commission of a crime or
fraud. The same public policy governs the permission provided in sub-
paragraphs (3)(D) and (E) and the mandate of paragraph (4). Where the
client is planning or engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct, or where
the culpability of the lawyer's conduct is involved, full protection of
client information is not justified.
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11. Several other situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer
may not "advise the violation of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal
unless the [lawyer] believes in good faith that such law, rule, or ruling is
invalid." CRPC 3-210. It is also the duty of a lawyer to "counsel or main-
tain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as appear to him or her
legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public of-
fense." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(c) (West Supp. 1995). Compliance
with the law may sometimes require a lawyer to reveal confidential infor-
mation, such as when a court orders the lawyer to do so. Subparagraph
(3)(C) permits a lawyer to disclose confidential information in order to
comply with a court order or other law. Situations may also arise where
the lawyer may have to reveal information relating to the representation
in order to avoid assisting a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct, and
subparagraph (3)(D) permits such disclosures. A lawyer's duty to prevent
the use of false or fabricated evidence is a special instance of the duty,
prescribed in section 6068(c) and CRPC 3-210, to avoid advising or assist-
ing the violation of any law. Subparagraph (3)(C) permits revealing infor-
mation necessary to comply with CRPC 3-210, and paragraph (4) requires
disclosure in some situations involving false evidence.
12. Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past
conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation,
the lawyer has not violated CRPC 3-210 because "advising" or "assisting"
criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of
that character. Since the lawyer's services were made an instrument of
the client's crime or fraud, the lawyer has a legitimate interest both in
rectifying the consequences of such conduct and in avoiding charges that
the lawyer's participation was culpable. Subparagraph (3)(E) gives the
lawyer professional discretion to reveal both unprivileged and privileged
information to serve those interests. In view of California Evidence Code
sections 956 and 956.5, however, such information will rarely be privi-
leged.
13. Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective con-
duct that is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer's knowledge of the client's
purpose may enable the lawyer to prevent commission of the prospective
crime or fraud. When the threatened injury is grave, the social interest in
preventing the harm and the lawyer's interest in not being used as an
instrument of crime or fraud may be more compelling than the interest
in preserving confidentiality of information. As stated in subparagraph
(3)(D), the lawyer has professional discretion, based on a reasonable
belief that the facts warrant it, to reveal both privileged and unprivileged
information in order to prevent the client's commission of any criminal
or fraudulent act. In some situations of this sort, disclosure is mandato-
ry. See paragraph (4) and Comments 17-20.
1480
[Vol. 22: 1467, 19951 Duty of Confidentiality
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
14. The lawyer's exercise of discretion under subparagraphs (3)(D) and
(E) involves consideration of such factors as the magnitude, proximity,
and likelihood of the contemplated wrong, the nature of the lawyer's
relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the
client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction, and factors that
may extenuate the client's conduct in question. In any case, a disclosure
adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer be-
lieves necessary to the purpose. Although preventive action is permitted
by subparagraphs (3)(D) and (E), failure to take preventive action does
not violate those provisions. But see paragraph (4). This section does not
define standards of civil liability for lawyers for professional conduct, a
matter left to judicial precedent and development.
15. Sub-paragraph (3)(F) recognizes the necessity of allowing a lawyer
to prove the services rendered in an action to collect a fee. This aspect
of the rule, in regard to privileged information, expresses the principle
that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit the rela-
tionship to the detriment of the fiduciary. See CAL EVID. CODE § 958
(West 1966 & Supp. 1995) (allowing no lawyer-client privilege "as to a
communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the
client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship"). Any disclo-
sure by the lawyer, however, should be as protective of the client's inter-
ests as possible.
16. If the client is an organization, a lawyer also should refer to CRPC
3-600 and its commentary to determine the appropriate conduct in con-
nection with this statute.
E. Mandatory Disclosure Adverse to Client to Rectify False Evidence
17. Paragraph (4) places upon a lawyer professional obligations in
certain situations to make disclosures in order to rectify a fraud on a
tribunal. When evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is provided by a
person who is not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless
of the client's wishes. See CRPC 5-200(A) (requiring that lawyers employ
"such means only as are consistent with truth"). Criminal laws also pro-
hibit the use of false evidence. When false evidence is offered by the cli-
ent, a conflict arises between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's reve-
lations confidential and the duty of candor to the court. Upon ascertain-
ing that material evidence is false, the lawyer should seek to persuade
the client that the evidence should not be offered or, if it has been of-
fered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed. If the
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persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial mea-
sures so long as doing so is practicable. See CRPC 3-210.
18. Fraud on a tribunal is an important special instance of the principle
that a lawyer cannot offer false evidence. See CRPC 5-200(A); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 565 (West Supp. 1995). In the case of criminal fraud on a tribu-
nal, unlike those situations of fraud on a third person governed by the
permissive disclosure authority of subparagraphs (3)(D) and (E), the
lawyer has a duty to take reasonable remedial steps if the client refuses
to rectify the fraud. The public interest in the integrity of judicial pro-
ceedings is a more important interest than that of private economic
harm. Consequently, a lawyer should. be required rather than merely
permitted to rectify fraud on a tribunal.
19. If perjured testimony or false evidence has been unknowingly of-
fered by a lawyer, the lawyer's proper course ordinarily is to remonstrate
with the client privately. If that fails, the lawyer should seek to withdraw
if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will not remedy the situa-
tion or is impossible, the lawyer should make disclosure to the court. It
is then for the court to determine what should be done-making a state-
ment about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps
nothing. If the false testimony was that of the client, the client may con-
trovert the lawyer's version of the communication when the lawyer dis-
closes the information to the court. If there is an issue whether the client
has committed perjury, the lawyer cannot represent the client and a
mistrial may be unavoidable.
20. Because it is very difficult for a lawyer to know when a client in-
tends to or has offered false evidence, the lawyer is required by para-
graph (4) to act only if the lawyer has information that produces a firm
conviction that material false evidence will or has been offered. Although
a violation of paragraph (4) will subject a lawyer to disciplinary action,
the lawyer's decisions whether or how to act should not constitute
grounds for discipline unless the lawyer's conduct in the light of those
decisions was unreasonable under all existing circumstances as they
-reasonably appeared to the lawyer at the time.
F. Withdrawal
21. If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially fur-
thering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must with-
draw. See CRPC 3-700(B). After withdrawal, a lawyer's conduct continues
to be governed by this section. The lawyer's duties of disclosure under
paragraph (4) continue until reasonable remedial measures are no longer
reasonably possible. This statute does not prevent the lawyer from giving
notice of the fact of withdrawal, nor does it forbid the lawyer from with-
drawing or disaffirming any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.
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G. Other Rdes of Law
22. Various other rules of law may permit or require a lawyer to dis-
close information relating to the representation. See, e.g., CAL EvID.
CODE §§ 956-962 (West 1966 & Supp. 1995) (dealing with disclosure of
privileged information when ordered by a court). In addition to those
provisions, a lawyer may be obligated by other provisions of statutes or
other law to reveal information about a client. Whether another provision
of law supersedes the provisions of this section is a matter of interpreta-
tion left to the courts, but subparagraph (3)(C) protects from discipline a
lawyer who acts on a reasonable belief as to the effect of such laws.
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